Friday, December 11, 2015

Ads trickery

For whatever reason the cluster-maps widget began to
distribute ads via their feed.

As I have strong no-ads policy here, I was forced to delete
it. Thats a bit unfortunate as I really liked it and
it was a cool widget to see where visitors came from.
Wrong move!

If anyone knows how I could disable the ads w/o
disabling the entire cluster-maps widget or knows about
an ad-free alternative to it, please leave me a comment.

Thursday, December 10, 2015

deniability trickery

Pushed some new changes to opmsg git:

o deniable personas: opmsg now supports OTR-style messages
  that are signed and integrity protected but still deniable
  so your peer cannot proof you wrote a certain message. Nothing
  in the message format changes and you can use deniable messages
  as any other ones. Please check the README about this topic.

o Its now possible to specify more than one -E target persona to
  support Cc/Bcc of emails. Please note the slight mutt config
  changes: '%r' vs. %r if you are going to use Cc (also check

Thursday, December 3, 2015

randup trickery

We at opmsg team take security very serious. Really.

So at times we end up digging in underlying libs which
we use, to understand entropy and key generation.
Since we take security so serious (really), we are very Nazi
about entropy. If we find anything that might be an issue
or could be an issue if used in certain environments,
we take all necessary actions to protect you.

So this time we inform you, our valued customer, that
usage of libressl in certain Linux environments could
be dangerous with regard to key generation. In nested
container environments (cloud!) the state of the PRNG
may be cloned and there is nothing you, our valued
customer, can do about it via the libcrypto API.
Thats why we, who take security very serious, informed
the libressl team and proposed a solution.

PoC and solution may be found here. Please note that
this is different from the CLONE_PID issue in past
which allowed for reuse of pids but is no longer possible
on recent Linux kernels.

Beside that, opmsg team acknowledges time and effort libressl
developers invest into the project and found libressl
code clean and mature. We continue supporting and recommend
use of libressl in opmsg.

Thursday, November 19, 2015

more packet trickery

Pushed some more changes to libusipp git:

 o 802.11 stuff for better frame handling (wanna chat
   about wireless firmware exploits? Come talk to me [1] :)
 o No longer needing libdnet for ARP objects, which means
   that ARP and EAPOL is now also available on OSX. So since
   now you as well bypass your favorite 802.1x Switch-Nazi with
   your oh so cool iShit

[1] Me also interested in any patches already existing to
    use the radiotap pflags channel element for TX (e.g.
    setting TX channel per packet. the channel flag only seems
    to notify about RX channel for captured packets and is
    ignored for transmission?).

I know: the libusipp API is not very stable, but I dont mind.
All my github projects requiring libusipp properly build with
latest pull.

Friday, October 23, 2015

da packets

Ported libusi++ to OSX. While doing so it was necessary
to lowercase all the enums like IPPROTO_UDP as the Xcode
compiler also tries to expand the enums (unlike gcc).
And as macro definitions pollute the global namespace
from either netinet/in.h or dnet, this was necessary. Its much
cleaner code now and also works with -pedantic.

While porting libusi++ to OSX, it was therefore necessary
to adjust some of the other code to reflect lowercase
enums, such as QI. Also polished QI to work against the
Darwin TCP stack, so its now possible to QUANTUM INSERT
into Safari. Seems like the Darwin TCP stack requires nonzero
TCP window and Safari ACKed GET requests before accepting
the (injected) reply.

After all TCP/IP stacks evolve over time and theres enough
relaxing space in the RFCs to break INSERT tools by small
semantic changes in the TCP stacks (sometimes called finger
printing). So dont expect QI as-is
to work in 10 years. Interesting to see that such quite simple
technique still contains some pitfalls.

All in all that was fun with lost packets. Tomorrow biking
to lost places to shoot some nice pictures of lost sofas. :)

Thursday, September 17, 2015

opmsg BoringSSL tests

Recently tested opmsg against G's fork of OpenSSL, named BoringSSL.

Thats more of a smoke test rather than a recommended
setup. BoringSSL is downstripped and does not provide
certain algorithms like ripmed or blowfish. It is
also missing the brainpool EC curves. It also does
not offer the CFB modes for any of their block cipher
algorithms. Some functions for EC-POINT conversions have
had to be re-implemented. After that, it cleanly builds
with BoringSSL.

If you know what you are doing (e.g. not using any
missing mentioned algorithms or modes from above)
AND you dont have peers that use brainpool EC curves,
you may use opmsg linked against BoringSSL.

The main reason for G was most likely to be upper
hand for new algorithms like ChaCha20 from DJB which
is optimized for (embedded) software such as on
smartphone SoC's which are missing native crypto instructions like AES-NI. So they dont need to wait for other projects
to add support for it.
Yet, its still not feasible for me to add ChaCha20
to opmsg as standard OpenSSL is not yet supporting it.

If you have a short link to the OpenSSL project, ask them
to add ChaCha20+Poly1305 to master (its already in a
special fork) :)

Thursday, September 10, 2015

opmsg trickery

opmsg has received some attention recently thanks to Phil
and his PGP de-setup. Some people checked the protocol
and there have not been any major fuckups so far.

Thanks to the people involved in the discussions.

The new version:

o Introduces version=2 messages which also hash src-id and dst-id
  in the KDF to derive the session-key which prevents
  theoretically possible evil-maid adaptive choosen ciphertext
  attacks (that should never happen in practise as failed
  decrypted messages will just be ignored and not be reported
  back to the sender several thousand times). version=2 must be
  configured in the config.
o Adds the possibility to restrict kex-id usage (upon decrypt)
  to the dedicated peer (this will detect/avoid cross-persona
  references of kex-id's). peer_isolation=1 in the config which
  is off by default.
o persona self-linking to implement deniable, yet still properly
  signed/verified, messages. See the README.

Its all inter-operable so pulling the git doesnt break
anything, except 5E's GPG brute-force cluster. :)

version=2 will be made default once enough time passed
so that most folks pulled the git meanwhile and support
for it is widely available. I'd also like to add some of the new 
ciphers like chacha20 but it seems only LibreSSL has got them so 
far. This would render messages unreadable for recipients which 
link against OpenSSL.

Friday, September 4, 2015

Contact trickery

If you send me messages via blogger, do not forget
to include your contact address (email) into the message
body if you hope for an answer. The default address is always

Monday, July 6, 2015

EC persona trickery

EC persona support has been added to opmsg.

The benefit is that generation of EC personas may be done
within milli seconds. So the threshold of throwing away
personas or to generate new ones for each contact has
almost lowered to zero. It all works transparently to
the user who just needs to use --newecp instead of --newp
when creating a new persona. Instead of DH Kex, opmsg
transparently uses ECDH Kex in that case. As all group
parameters are within the pubkey blob, this does not require
for DH parameters such as in the RSA case.

For the ECC algos, the Brainpool curves are used which
are standartized by RFC 5639 which explain how the group
parameters were selected, unlike for the potentially
backdoored NIST curves.

Thursday, June 25, 2015

pita bread trickery

As can be read here, its known since quite some time that the
CPU is emitting frequencies upon operation which contains
enough "signature" so that crypto keys may be
recovered. This happens namely during RSA decryption
and signing operations. As this is a public paper using
public available SDRs and thinking 20years ahead, theres
good chance that there are setups today with antennas and sufficient DSP computing power that may recover keys from a far larger distance than just the mentioned 50cm.

What does that mean for opmsg?

In the new version (1.3), I enabled RSA-blinding during decryption and signing. During "normal operation" due to the DH 
keys in use, there should be no attack surface. In the worst case
the attacker just recovers the private half of the DH key of
his own specially crafted message.
Further, opmsg verifies integrity of the sender before any 
decryption so you cant decrypt specially crafted messages (as 
required in the paper) from strangers who hope to capture
signals once the message is processed.
Its already recommended (and easy to setup) to use a dedicated 
persona for each peer. If you follow that guideline, even
w/o RSA blinding the attacker can just decrypt his own messages.

What else is new?

 o The use of RSA-fallback mode can now be seen in output
 o it is possible to --burn keys (only use once)

Thursday, May 21, 2015

weakdh trickery

Now, that the TURMOIL slides make sense, I adjusted my own
projects. The good news is that I always used to generate
unique DH params (I wonder so many ppl apparently didnt -
there is no real benefit to use hard coded values, except to Eve!?)
in my projects during or before build. So it should be
quite hard for a Nation State Adversary to break that.

For lophttpd and crashd, I removed 512 and 1024 bit DH params
support and use 2048bit instead. opmsg always supported
2048bit (and higher), but the default was 1024. So I changed
the default to 2048 bit. Existing personas can be "upgraded" by
using the --newdhp switch. I was thinking this switch
may just be used in rare cases, but now it turns out it
was the right decision to design opmsg protocol with easy
DH params re-creation in mind. SUCCESS! DH keys that are
already "in flight" cant be upgraded, but may be used
as before (taking the 'weaker' 1024bit into account) even
after upgrading to 2048bit DH params.

Unfortunally, 2048bit keys come at the cost of a longer key
generation process. This may take a couple of minutes.
If thats too much for you, you are free to change your default
DH params len to 1892 or whatever your level of secrecy

Thursday, May 7, 2015

opmsg trickery

Given the recent crypto discussion, mass surveillance and
cyber jokes in general, I uploaded a new project to my github.
It was about time.

I wonder whether our gov is equally toast/bad in other fields,
or if I just get pointed to it because I have some background
in this field and am blind to all the other failures where
I am missing the knowledge. (SIGILL//NOPORN)

The first review round is over and it seems like opmsg
concept found some friends. I got some recommendations
which were incorporated in the git. Thats new:

- fixing insufficient hashing of persona key to
  detect tampering of RSA keys during transit/import
  (RSA's e value was simply not part of the hash and it now is)
- removing OFB cipher modes in favor of CTR and GCM modes (AES)
- adding option to allow linking of personas (see README)
- adding cygwin support

It is incredibly hard to review your own code; so thanks to
myself. While I buy the OFB arguments, I am not sure if its
a benefit to add ECC support for personas. ECC is mostly based
on curves with parameters chosen by NIST. The same NIST that is
suspected of putting backdoors in crypto standards
(slides), even more in standards that use ECC to generate
randomness! Knowing this, why should I trust any parameters 
chosen by them? You can argue that suite-B, the NSA approved 
standards for protecting US gov infra, is unlikely to contain 
backdoors for themself and that this would be a tough bluff
to do so just to read Putin's email. But given the additional
implementation cost (maybe I should crowdfund it?) for
little benefit or even "badfit" this seems not worth the effort.

Thursday, April 23, 2015

C++11 bailout trickery

Is someone C++11 guru enough to make a statement whether
the following C++11 code is correct? In particular on
whats happening on line 24, as the lambda should not
harvest the memory structures (scope?).
To me, everything looks OK. If thats the case, it would ease
a lot of cleanup routines on error returns from functions.
Please leave a comment.

Sample C++ code

Wednesday, March 25, 2015

troubleshooter trickery

Demo of SELinux disable on a Fedora 21 default desktop. A full writeup can be found here.

Thursday, January 8, 2015

U2F trickery

In the last post I promised to stop threat analyzing. So here
is some dev again which I already started developing back
in 2014 and where I finally found some time to finish.
Its a small U2F stack with the APDU framing code based
on Googles U2F reference code. After reviewing a lot of other
U2F code (sigh!), I found this reference code comprehensive enough to be usable for myself and for PAM code.
It also builds on Darwin, but I didnt have time to test it